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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Chapter 35, Section 287(a) (“Marking Statute”), of the Patent Act of 
1952 provides the following: 
 
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling 
within the United States any patented article for or under 
them, or importing any patented article into the United 
States, may give notice to the public that the same is 
patented, either by fixing thereon the word "patent" or the 
abbreviation "pat.", together with the number of the patent, 
or when, from the character of the article, this can not be 
done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more 
of them is contained, a label containing a like notice. In the 
event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered 
by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on 
proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and 
continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages 
may be recovered only for infringement occurring after 
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such notice.  Filing of an action for infringement shall 
constitute such notice.1 
 
[2]  The Marking Statute expressly limits the patent owner’s recovery of 
damages if the patent owner, anyone making, offering for sale, or selling, 
failed to mark its patented invention, being sold within the United States, 
with the associated patent number.  In these cases, damages must be 
limited to those that accrue after the infringer is provided actual notice of 
infringement.  The authors suggest that, in light of relevant jurisprudence 
and the purpose of the Marking Statute, owners of patents that are directed 
to any business activities on the Internet should mark their own websites, 
and require their licensees to mark their websites, with the relevant patent 
numbers to avail themselves of constructive notice.2 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
[3]  The first American patent statute did not contain a marking 
requirement.3  The United States Supreme Court in Boyden v. Burke4 
explained that all patents were public records and “[a]ll persons [were] 
bound to take notice of their contents . . .”5  The first marking duty was 
imposed by the Patent Act of 1842,6 which required all patentees and 
assignees to mark each product sold with the date of the patent.7  Failure 
to mark a product would result in a fine of “not less than one hundred 
dollars.”8  The statutory penalty was eventually removed by the Patent Act 
of 1861 which instead provided that “no damages shall be recovered” by 
the patent owner unless there was constructive notice by marking, or 
actual notice to the infringer.9  The Patent Act of 1927 changed the 
required marking from the date of patent to the word “patent” and the 
                                                 
1
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). 
2
 Constructive notice, as used in this article, refers to notice of patent protection resulting 
from affirmative marking of a patented article. 
3
 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03(7)(c) (2006) [hereinafter CHISUM 
ON PATENTS]. 
4
 Boyden v. Burke, 55 U.S. 575 (1852). 
5
 Id. at 582-83. 
6
 Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 395-96 (1936). 
7
 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Act of 
1842, 5 Stat. 543, 544). 
8
 Id.  
9
 Id. 
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patent number.10  The Patent Act of 1952 codified the Marking Statute as 
it exists today and states that the patentee can provide sufficient 
constructive notice by abbreviating “patent” to “pat.” instead.11  The 
patent owner is thus required by the Marking Statute to mark all patented 
articles offered for sale in the United States in order to avail itself of the 
constructive notice requirement and be able to recover damages as of the 
date of infringement.12 
 
[4]  The purposes of the Marking Statute are to 1) help avoid penalizing 
for innocent infringement; 2) encourage patentees to give notice to the 
public that the article is patented; and 3) aid the public in identifying 
whether an article is patented.13  Due to its public policy rationale, the 
marking duty can be analogized to estoppel14 or reasonable reliance.15  
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has 
explained that marking is a form of “in rem notice to the world” of patent 
protection,16 rendering the duty to mark a proactive measure imposed on 
the patent owner.17  As such, knowledge of patent protection by an alleged 
infringer is immaterial,18 and the patent owner is itself required to comply 
                                                 
10
 See Carl Oppedahl, Patent Marking of Systems, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 205, 210 (1995) [hereinafter Oppedahl] (providing an extensive discussion of 
the history of the marking requirement). 
11
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
12
 See Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed Cir. 
1994) (explaining that a patent holder may recover damages on unmarked articles only 
after either the infringer received actual notice of infringement or the filing date of an 
infringement lawsuit). 
13
 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal 
citations omitted). 
14
 See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 211 (explaining that when a patent owner fails to mark 
a patented item “it may be understood to have led the public to believe that [the item] is 
not patented, and thus cannot be heard to complain for damages if a member of the public 
who has not been given actual notice of the patent chooses to copy the product.”). 
15
 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (holding 
that where there is no marking present, the “public may rely upon the lack of notice in 
exploiting shapes and designs accessible to all.”). 
16
 Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
17
 Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187 (citing Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1894) 
holding that notice “is an affirmative act, and something to be done by [the patent 
owner].”). 
18
 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (agreeing with Amsted, 24 
F.3d at 187 that “it is irrelevant…whether the defendant knew of…his own 
infringement.”). 
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with the Marking Statute and is also required to police compliance by its 
licensees.19  Lack of marking does not constitute an affirmative defense 
but limits the recovery of pre-notice damages.20 
 
III.  COMPLIANCE WITH THE MARKING STATUTE ON THE INTERNET 
 
[5]  The Marking Statute states that a patent owner can satisfy the notice 
requirement by either providing constructive notice by marking its 
“patented article” with the relevant patent number21 or by providing actual 
notice “of the infringement” to the infringer.22  It expressly states that 
where actual notice of infringement has not been provided, “[f]iling of an 
action for infringement shall constitute such notice.”23  Thus, the statute 
provides that a patent owner “is entitled to damages from the time when it 
either began marking its product in compliance with section 287(a) or 
when it actually notified [the accused infringer] of its infringement, 
whichever was earlier.”24  It is widely accepted that marking is not 
required when neither the patent owner nor its licensees produce the 
patented article25 or when the patent-in-suit is only directed to a process or 
a method,26 because in both situations there is “nothing to mark.”27  
                                                 
19
 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(ii) (citing a myriad of cases at n. 130 
to support the conclusion that the patent owner must supervise those acting “under 
[him]”); see also Amsted, 24 F.3d at 185 (explaining that “[a] licensee who makes or sells 
a patented article does so ‘for or under’ the patentee, thereby limiting the patentee’s 
damage recovery when the patented article is not marked.”). 
20
 Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 769 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
21
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993); accord 
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
25
 Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397 (1936); see also 
Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that 
even though Wine Ry. interpreted a predecessor to the current Marking Statute, it applies 
to the modern statutory counterpart). 
26
 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538 (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 
346 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (distinguishing cases where the patent-in-suit contains 
both method and apparatus claims from those where the patent-in-suit contains only 
method claims, and holding that where the patent-in-suit contains only method claims 
and the infringing product is made using the patented method, the Marking Statute does 
not apply to limit the patent owner’s recovery of damages). 
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Patents dealing with activities on the Internet can take the form of a 
system,28 software,29 business method,30 or combination thereof. 
 
A.  CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE BY MARKING 
 
1.  WEBSITE IS THE PATENTED ARTICLE 
 
[6]  When a website is expressly included in a patent claim, it functions as 
a direct limitation on the scope of the patent.  The Federal Circuit has not 
had the opportunity to determine whether a website can constitute a 
patented article.  However, case law indicates that when given the 
opportunity, the Federal Circuit will likely hold that a website that is 
expressly claimed in the patent-in-suit constitutes a patented article under 
the Marking Statute and must be marked to satisfy the constructive notice 
requirement and not limit the recovery of damages. 
 
[7]  The Marking Statute expressly requires any “patented article” to be 
marked.31  Absent direction from the Federal Circuit,32 district courts have 
held that the determination of whether an article “embodies” a patent and 
constitutes a “patented article” parallels an inquiry into whether an article 
infringes a patent.33  Such an inquiry requires a two-step analysis.34  First, 
                                                                                                                         
27
 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538. 
28
 See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 223 (suggesting that complex, possibly geographically 
dispersed, systems that combine several patented items, both method and apparatus, 
should be marked by patent numbers corresponding to every patent containing apparatus 
claims in order to comply with the marking requirements of § 287 (a)). 
29
 See State St. Bank & Trust Co., v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a computer “programmed with…software [ ] admittedly 
produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result’” and is “statutory subject matter, even if 
the useful result is expressed in numbers….”). 
30
 See id. (explaining that when an innovative business method meets the statutory 
requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness, it may be protected under the 
patent law as any other process or method). 
31
 35 U.S.C. § 287 (a) (1999). 
32
 John LaBarre & Xavier Gomez-Velasco, Ready, Set, Mark Your Patented Software!, 
12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 37 (2005) [hereinafter LaBarre & Gomez-Velasco] (stating 
that the Federal Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to address what constitutes a 
“patented article” under the Marking Statute). 
33
 Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D. La. 1992); 
see also Clancy Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Symbol Techs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (D. Colo. 
1997) (stating that “one test for determining whether a product is a ‘patented article’ 
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all claims in the patent-in-suit must be construed in a Markman hearing to 
determine their scope and meaning.35  Second, the properly construed 
patent claims must be compared to the article in question to decide 
whether the claims cover the article.36  As a question of fact, the second 
prong of this test is to be left to the trier of fact.37 
 
[8]  By analogy, the test of whether an article is covered by the patent-in-
suit and constitutes a “patented article” under the Marking Statute, 
requires the court to ask if the article had been produced or sold by 
someone other than the patentee or its licensees, “would it directly and 
literally infringe the independent claims of the patent.”38  This inquiry 
looks to the relationship between the article in question and the patent-in-
suit.39   
 
[9]  Based on the foregoing discussion, when a website is expressly 
disclosed in, or otherwise falls within the scope of one of the patent 
claims, it acts as a limitation on the scope of the patent and constitutes a 
“patented article.”40  In this situation, the language of the Marking Statute 
makes clear that the patent owner and its licensees must mark such a 
website with the relevant patent numbers to avail themselves of the 
benefits of constructive notice and to be capable of recovering damages as 
of the date of infringement. 
 
2.  THE WEBSITE IS NOT THE PATENTED ARTICLE 
 
[10]  The Federal Circuit has rendered several arguably conflicting 
decisions relating to the marking duty as it applies where the patent-in-suit 
does not claim the article or website in question.  The question then 
                                                                                                                         
under section 287(a) is to ask whether the product would infringe the patent if sold by an 
unauthorized party.”). 
34
 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
35
 Id.; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
36
 Id. 
37
 Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
38
 Laitram, 806 F. Supp. at 1296; see also Clancy, 953 F. Supp. at 1173. 
39
 Broadcom Corp. v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. 04-CIV-2416, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18163, 
*9-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2004) (following Clancy and Laitram in applying the two-part 
“patented article” test). 
40
 35 U.S.C. § 287 (a) (1999). 
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becomes what conditions must be met to trigger the marking duty in 
relation to a website even though the website is not the “patented article.”  
The Federal Circuit has announced several possible solutions.  The most 
recent Marking Statute case decided by the Federal Circuit, Sentry 
Protection Products v. Eagle Manufacturing Co.,41 did not overrule or 
distinguish any of the following cases and each can presumably support a 
valid legal argument. 
 
I.  NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO MARK WHEN ONLY METHOD CLAIMS ARE 
FOUND INFRINGED EVEN THOUGH THE PATENT MAY CONTAIN BOTH 
METHOD AND APPARATUS CLAIMS 
 
[11]  One line of cases holds that the Marking Statute does not apply 
where only process or method claims are being asserted because there is 
no “patented article” that satisfies the requirements of the statute.  For 
example, in Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area,42 Hanson was awarded a 
patent covering a method and apparatus for making snow used in winter 
sports and licensed its use and development to Snow Machines 
Incorporated (“SMI”).43  One competitor, Hedco, Inc., sold snow-making 
devices that used Hanson’s patented method to Alpine Valley Ski Area, 
Inc. (“Alpine”) without a license or permission from Hanson.44  The 
district court held that Hanson’s patent was valid and infringed by 
Alpine.45 
 
[12]  On appeal, Alpine argued that Hanson was precluded from 
recovering damages for the infringement prior to the filing of the lawsuit 
because Hanson’s licensee, SMI, did not mark the devices that it sold with 
the patent number.46  Judge Friedman noted that even though Hanson’s 
patent contained both apparatus and method claims, the only claims found 
infringed, after claim construction and relevant comparison, were directed 
to a method.47  The Federal Circuit cited its recent decision in Bandag, 
Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc., when holding that the notice requirement of 
                                                 
41
 Sentry Prot. Prods. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 919 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
42
 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
43
 Id. at 1076. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at 1082. 
47
 Id. at 1083. 
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the Marking Statute did not apply to limit the recovery of damages where 
only process or method claims were found infringed.48 
 
[13]  Similarly, in Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl,49 Devices for 
Medicine sued Boehl for infringement of three patents disclosing and 
claiming apparatus and methods of using introducers to insert medical 
devices into the human body.50  On appeal, Judge Markey did not engage 
in a full discussion of the marking requirement51 but agreed with Hanson 
that where a patent contains method and apparatus claims, notice under the 
Marking Statute is not required where only method claims were being 
asserted.52   
 
[14]  Based on Hanson and Devices for Medicine, marking of a website is 
presumably not required when it is not the “patented article” itself but 
merely uses an asserted process or method claimed in the patent-in-suit.  
The Federal Circuit based its holding in both cases on the well-established 
principle that the Marking Statute does not limit the recovery of damages 
when the patent-in-suit is directed at a process or method.53  Mere use of a 
patented method does not produce a website, and as such, does not bring it 
within the language of the Marking Statute.  Both cases are still good law, 
as Hanson was recently cited with approval in State Contracting & 
Engineering Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc.,54 for the proposition that the 
Marking Statute does not apply when only process claims were found 
infringed and the patent contained apparatus claims.55   
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 Id. (citing Bandag Inc. v. Gerrad Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
49
 Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
50
 Id. at 1063. 
51
 The Federal Circuit found that Devices for Medicine failed to preserve its objection to 
damages for appeal.  See generally id. 
52
 Id. at 1066; see also Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 221 (stating that marking is not 
required when only method claims are asserted, but where apparatus claims are being 
asserted, the apparatus needs to be marked). 
53
 See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text; see also LaBarre & Gomez-Velasco, 
supra note 32, at ¶¶ 11-12. 
54
 State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
55
 Id. 
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II.  NO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO MARK UNLESS A PATENT CONTAINS BOTH 
METHOD AND APPARATUS CLAIMS AND A TANGIBLE ITEM THAT HAS BEEN 
PRODUCED BY THE INFRINGED METHOD CLAIM EXISTS 
 
[15]  Another line of cases suggests that where a tangible item is not 
claimed in the patent-in-suit, but is produced by a claimed method in the 
patent, it sufficiently constitutes a “patented article” under the Marking 
Statute even though it is not the patented invention itself.  Instructive on 
point, in American Medical Systems v. Medical Engineering Corp.,56 
American Medical Systems, Inc. (“AMS”) and Medical Engineering Corp. 
(“MEC”) were both “vigorous competitors” in the development, 
marketing, and sale of penile prostheses.57  AMS developed and received a 
patent claiming a new “apparatus and method for packaging a fluid-
containing penile prosthesis in a pre-filled, sterile state.”58  The claimed 
method resulted in a packaging configuration referred to as the “wet pack” 
and was advantageous to the older dry-pack packaging system.59  At the 
same time, MEC was also working on its own method of creating a wet 
pack for its own prostheses.60  During a trade show, MEC personnel saw 
AMS’s packaging and replicated the package’s design.61  After finding 
that MEC had infringed AMS’s patent, the district court limited AMS’s 
recovery of damages for lost profits to those incurred after the filing of the 
lawsuit due to an initial failure to mark in compliance with the Marking 
Statute.62 
 
[16]  On appeal to the Federal Circuit, AMS argued that the district court 
improperly limited its recovery of damages.63  AMS argued that it was not 
required to mark its “wet pack” under the Marking Statute because it only 
asserted a method claim at trial.64  Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge 
Michel analyzed relevant precedent and held that: 
 
                                                 
56
 Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 1528. 
61
 Id.    
62
 Id. at 1530. 
63
 Id. at 1538. 
64
 Id. 
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The purpose behind the marking statute is to encourage the 
patentee to give notice to the public of the patent. The 
reason that the marking statute does not apply to method 
claims is that, ordinarily, where the patent claims are 
directed to only a method or process there is nothing to 
mark. Where the patent contains both apparatus and 
method claims, however, to the extent that there is a 
tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted 
method claims can be given, a party is obliged to do so if it 
intends to avail itself of the constructive notice provisions 
of section 287(a).65 
 
This pronouncement suggests the possibility that the Federal Circuit is no 
longer convinced that the Marking Statute does not apply to claims 
directed at a process or method in any situation and in all circumstances.  
The difficulty with Judge Michel’s often cited American Medical Systems 
directive is that if a patent contains both apparatus and method claims, 
marking a tangible item that implements or provides access to a claimed 
method, but is not the claimed apparatus, may be deceptive and even seen 
as an implicit limitation on the scope of the patent.66  Another drawback 
inherent in marking an item that is not the “patented article” is that such 
marking has no direct connection to the patent itself.  This lack of 
connection may give rise to implications of false marking under Section 
292 of the Patent Act.67  Although the requisite intent to deceive the public 
can be negated by a showing of goodwill to provide public notice of patent 
                                                 
65
 Id. at 1538-39 (emphasis added). 
66
 See Oppedahl, supra note 10, at 216 (suggesting that a patent owner may argue that 
marking a non-covered product may “amount[] to an admission regarding the scope of 
the claims of the patent.”). 
67
 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2007); Professor Chisum explains that the Patent Act prohibits three 
types of false marking: 
(1) counterfeit marking (i.e. use of a patent mark 
without the patent owner’s permission); (2) false 
patent marking (i.e. the use of a patent mark on an 
unpatented article); and (3) false patent pending 
marking (i.e. the use of ‘patent applied for’ or ‘patent 
pending’ when no patent application covering the 
article is in fact pending) 
CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(vii). 
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protection,68 this added risk may be a deterrent for some patent owners 
who are unwilling to engage in litigation. 
 
[17]  However, the careful wording used by Judge Michel in American 
Medical Systems suggests that this potential risk may have been foreseen 
and addressed.  The Federal Circuit found that AMS was required to mark 
its “wet pack” with the patent-in-suit because it was a “physical device 
produced by the claimed method that was capable of being marked.”69  
This language implies that the court was looking for a nexus between the 
asserted method of a combination patent and a tangible item that is 
connected, by means of its creation, to the asserted method.  After this 
nexus is established between the tangible item and the asserted method, 
the tangible item is treated as a “patented article” under the Marking 
Statute and must be marked to provide constructive notice.  Several recent 
district court opinions dealing directly with website marking have relied 
on American Medical Systems to reach the same result. 
 
[18]  The first case to directly address whether a website is a tangible item 
for the purposes of the Marking Statute was Soverain Software L.L.C. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc.70  Soverain alleged that Amazon.com had infringed 
three patents by operating websites that included virtual shopping carts to 
conduct e-commerce.71  All three patents-in-suit contained both method 
and apparatus claims.72  Amazon.com argued that Soverain failed to 
produce evidence that any of its thirty-two licensees marked their websites 
with the relevant patent numbers.73  Soverain argued that a “website is an 
intangible object” that does not have to be marked.74  Judge Davis 
explained that “[w]hen dealing with a patent that includes method and 
apparatus claims, a tangible item that can be marked is required to be 
marked.”75   
 
                                                 
68
 CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(vii).   
69
 Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
70
 Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tex. 2005). 
71
 Id. at 906. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. at 909. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. (citing Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538 for support). 
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[19]  Recognizing that the case fell under the Federal Circuit’s holding in 
American Medical Systems, the court defined a website as a tangible item 
because “tangible item[s], as used in American Medical Systems, [are] 
those items that can be marked and intangible items [are] those that cannot 
be marked.”76  Although not expressly discussed, the facts and holding 
suggest that the court treated the licensees’ websites as the apparatus 
indicated in the patents-in-suit for implementing the method claims.  Since 
the websites were tangible items capable of being marked, the holding 
treated each website as a “patented article” under the Marking Statute. 
 
[20]  The same decision was reached by the district court in IMX, Inc. v. 
LendingTree, L.L.C.77  IMX asserted infringement of its patent covering 
an interactive “method and system for trading loans in real time” where 
loan applications were stored in a remote server database and could be 
accessed through a website.78  IMX created IMX Exchange software that 
could be accessed by lenders and brokers through a website.79  The 
website was not part of the claims and thus not the patented invention 
itself.80  IMX argued that unlike Soverain, its website did not practice the 
patent but was just the means through which the IMX Exchange software 
could be accessed.81  Judge Robinson held that while the website is not the 
patented invention, it “is intrinsic to the patented system and constitutes a 
‘tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted method can be 
given.’”82 
 
[21]  Soverain and IMX stand for two propositions.  First, a website is a 
tangible item that is capable of being marked to provide public notice.83  
Second, a website that is not the patented invention itself but is intrinsic to 
the patented invention constitutes a “patented article” under the Marking 
Statute and must be marked to provide constructive notice of patent 
                                                 
76
 Id. (first alteration in original). 
77
 IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C., No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179 
(D. Del. Dec. 14, 2005). 
78
 Id. at *3-4. 
79
 Id. at *4. 
80
 Id. at *9. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Id. at *12 (emphasis added). 
83
 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
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protection.84  Stated another way, a website that is created to provide 
access to, or allow users to interact with the patented invention, is intrinsic 
to the patented invention and constitutes a “patented article.”  This logic 
echoes the “produced by” and nexus requirements implied in American 
Medical Systems.85   
 
[22]  The intrinsic test used in IMX is also supported by the express 
language of the Marking Statute authorizing the marking of packaging that 
contains one or more patented articles when marking of the article itself is 
impossible due to its character.86  Using the facts in Soverain and IMX as a 
base, when the patent in question is directed to a system that is comprised 
of multiple elements, some tangible and some intangible,87 a website that 
incorporates or was created to provide access to the patented invention can 
be reasonably analogized to packaging that contains “one or more” 
patented articles.88  When marking of a tangible item, such as the remote 
server in IMX, is possible but would not provide sufficient public notice as 
required by the statute due to its inaccessibility to the public, marking the 
packaging will be sufficient.89 
                                                 
84
 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
85
 See IMX, Inc. v. Lending Tree, LLC, No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33179, at *12, n. 4 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2005) (“There is no meaningful distinction between 
a patented method that results in a product that can be marked [produced by] and a 
patented system that results in a service implemented through an Internet-based website 
that can be marked [nexus].”) (brackets added for emphasis). 
86
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
87
 See IMX, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 33179 at *3-4, 9 (noting that the patent-in-suit 
contained both method and system claims covering a system comprised of a “unique 
interactivity” to occur over the Internet, loan database, and remote transaction server); see 
also Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904, 906 (The patents-
in-suit “describe a network-based sales system that includes a buyer computer, a 
merchant computer, a payment computer, and a virtual shopping cart.”). 
88
 See Wayne-Gossard Corp. v. Sondra Mfg. Co., 579 F.2d 41, 43 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(suggesting that custom of the trade should be considered when determining whether 
marking of the packaging is sufficient, and indicating that marking of the package rather 
than the “fashion hosiery” socks themselves was sufficient to satisfy the marking 
requirement under § 287). 
89
 See Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 162 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“[M]arking 
of the package may sufficiently comply with the [marking] statute when there is some 
reasonable consideration presented for not marking the article . . . or . . . marking the 
article itself would not provide sufficient notice to the public.”). 
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[23]  The Federal Circuit in State Contractors & Engineering explained 
that the court should not search for some tangible item capable of being 
marked when the patent-in-suit contains only method claims.90  Marking is 
only required in connection with some fabricated article.91  Moreover, 
Hanson and Devices for Medicine are not at odds with the “produced by” 
limitation of American Medical Systems.  Hanson and Devices for 
Medicine addressed situations where the tangible items were not produced 
by the asserted methods but merely used those methods.  Under the 
holdings of both cases, marking is not required when a website is only 
using the patented method, even though the website is a tangible item.92  
Under American Medical Systems, Soverain, and IMX, when the website is 
produced by the patented method or is developed exclusively to provide 
access to the patented invention, it is intrinsic to the patented system and is 
treated as a “patented article” under the Marking Statute because of its 
close nexus to the patented system.93  The American Medical Systems 
                                                 
90
 See State Contr. & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1074 (“We have 
not previously held that a patent containing only method claims is examined to see if 
something could have been marked in order to assess whether the notice provision 
applies, and we decline to do so now.”). 
91
 Tex. Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (relying on 
Wine Railway to hold that marking is only required in connection with some fabricated 
article), overruled in part on other grounds by Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 
1319-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
92
 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
93
 See supra 69, 83-85 and accompanying text; see also Halliburton Servs. v. Smith Int'l, 
Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725-726 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (relying on American Medical 
Systems to require marking when the patent owner asserted patents that contained both 
method and apparatus or system claims and “distributed tangible items created by the 
[patented] methods and by which [the patent owner] could have given notice of [patent 
protection].”) (emphasis added); accord Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 312 
F. Supp. 2d 649, 651-52 (D. Del. 2004) (finding that where a tangible item is produced 
by an asserted method in a combination patent, and the tangible item is capable of being 
marked, it must be so marked to comply with American Medical Systems and the 
Marking Statute); accord Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 
2d 257, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that when a patent owner produced a physical 
item by the asserted method on which it could have given notice of patent protection, 
compliance with the Marking Statute was required); accord Inline Connection Corp. v. 
AOL Time Warner, 465 F. Supp. 2d 312, 324 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that when a service 
provider distributed a patented system where the only tangible item was a wall jack 
specifically designed for the patented system, the wall jack was intrinsic to the patented 
system and should have been marked to comply with the Marking Statute). 
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opinion does not overrule Hanson or Devices for Medicine, but rather 
builds on their rationales. 
 
3.  SUFFICIENCY OF MARKING 
 
[24]  Once a duty to mark is established, only full compliance with the 
Marking Statute will avail the patent owner of constructive notice.  The 
Marking Statute provides that the patented article itself, or, if marking the 
article itself cannot be done, the packaging where the article is contained, 
is to be marked.94  Marking must consist of “the word ‘patent’ or the 
abbreviation ‘pat.’ together with the number of the patent”95 and must be 
legible and accessible to an interested person.96  However, the location of 
marking is something that “must be left to the judgment of the patentee.”97 
 
[25]  The Federal Circuit, in American Medical Systems, explained that 
neither the express language nor legislative history of the Marking Statute 
imposes any time limit by which marking must begin in order to avail the 
patent owner of damages prior to the date of the lawsuit.98  Judge Michel 
noted that once marking begins, the policy purpose of the Marking Statute, 
to provide public notice of patent protection, has been satisfied and 
damages are no longer limited.99  The court construed the Marking Statute 
to “preclude recovery of damages only for infringement for any time prior 
to compliance with the marking or actual notice requirements of the 
statute.”100  It further found that a mere “delay between issuance of the 
patent and compliance with the marking provisions of section 287(a) will 
not prevent recovery of damages after the date that marking has begun.”101  
Therefore, once marking of a website has begun, it must be consistent 
throughout all webpages and establish a nexus between the patent and the 
patented system to satisfy the Marking Statute.  
                                                 
94
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
95
 Id. 
96
 See Trussell Mfg. Co. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 50 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1931) (holding 
that marking so fine that a magnifying glass is required to read it does not provide 
“sufficient notice to the public.”). 
97
 Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 50 (1892). 
98
 Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F. 3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. 
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I.  “SUBSTANTIALLY ALL” REQUIREMENT 
 
[26]  To assure compliance with the Marking Statute, substantially all 
websites of the patent owner and its licensees that constitute a “patented 
article,” expressly or by relation, must be marked.  In American Medical 
Systems, the Federal Circuit cautioned that “once marking has begun, it 
must be substantially consistent and continuous in order for the party to 
avail itself of the constructive notice provisions of the statute.”102  The 
consistent and continuous requirement is met when the patent owner and 
its licensees mark all patented articles made and no longer distribute 
unmarked products.103  When the patent owner or its licensees mark, but 
do not distribute the marked articles, the notice requirement has not been 
satisfied.104  However, the Federal Circuit in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,105 
has recognized the difficulty a patent owner may encounter when ensuring 
compliance by its licensees.  The court held that where the failure to mark 
is not caused by the patent owner, but rather by its licensees, whether 
marking was “substantially consistent and continuous”106 will be 
determined by a “rule of reason,”107 under which the court must inquire 
into whether the patent owner “made reasonable efforts to ensure 
compliance with the marking requirement.”108 
 
[27]  Although an omission of marking from any substantial number of 
distributed products constitutes noncompliance,109 it has been suggested 
that omission of marking from a relatively small number of patented 
articles made and sold might be dismissed as de minimis.110  Guided by 
                                                 
102
 Id. 
103
 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Maxwell v. 
J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
104
 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538; Nike, 138 F.3d at 1446. 
105
 Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1111-12. 
106
 See id. (relying on Am. Med. Systems, 6 F.3d at 1538 to support its holding). 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id.; see also Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner, 465 F. Supp. 2d 312, 323 
(D. Del. 2007) (citing Maxwell to support the application of the “rule of reason”). 
109
 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537. 
110
 See Hazeltine Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 20 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (D.N.Y. 1937) 
(interpreting the predecessor to § 287(a), Revised Statutes, § 4900, to require “marking of 
every patented article sold -- subject, of course, to the implied exception of de 
minimus.”);  
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equity, the Federal Circuit in Lisle Corp. v. Edwards,111 took the position 
that the policy of the Marking Statute does not require the marking of 
every patented article ever sold or distributed when such compliance 
“would be unduly burdensome, if not impossible.”112  However, “[w]here 
the public finds marking or writings upon the article itself, the public 
should be able to rely upon the fact that a patent, if it exists, should also be 
noted with that writing.”113 
 
[28]  While the “rule of reason” applies to provide additional protection to 
the patent owner when its licensees fail to mark a tangible item,114 it 
should not be relied upon.  To take advantage of the rule, the patent owner 
would have to show that it licensed its patent many times, making it 
unable to reasonably enforce marking by all licensees.  However, in the 
context of a website, the patent owner will likely be unable to make such a 
showing due to the ease of accessibility and indexing of websites in 
general, and the fact that it is very easy to mark a website with the relevant 
patent numbers.115  As such, the patent owner should police compliance 
with the Marking Statute by all of its licensees in order to satisfy the 
“substantially consistent and continuous” standard announced in American 
Medical Systems and its progeny.116 
 
II.  NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
 
[29]  The nexus requirement for finding a tangible item intrinsic to a 
“patented article” finds its way into the sufficiency of marking.  The 
purpose of the Marking Statute is to prevent innocent infringement by 
                                                                                                                         
accord Maxwell v. K Mart Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1323, 1336 (D. Minn. 1995) (citing 
Hazeltine to hold that an “implied de minimis exception protects the patentee whose 
compliance with the marking statute is nearly perfect.”); accord CHISUM ON PATENTS, 
supra note 3, § 20.03(7)(c)(iii), n. 151 (citing numerous cases to support the same 
proposition). 
111
 Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
112
 Id. at 695. 
113
 Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 158, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992).  Cf. Creative 
Pioneer Prods. Corp. v. K Mart Corp., No H-83-4137, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13474, at 
*14-15 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding that marking on a product’s packaging was insufficient 
to comply with the Marking Statute where the product had text embossed on its handle). 
114
 See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text. 
115
 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
116
 See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text. 
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providing public notice of patent protection.117  Sufficient notice must 
inform the public that a certain tangible item is covered by the listed 
patent.118  Such is the purpose of marking the “patented article” with 
“patent” or “pat.” and the relevant patent number.119  This requirement 
implies that a nexus must exist between the “patented article” and the 
patent.  Since a website consists of several webpages linked together, 
avoiding ambiguities requires that a marking note all relevant patents and 
either provide a clear and consistent statement of patent protection, or 
provide a more generalized patent statement covering the website as a 
whole. 
 
[30]  Consistency was addressed in IMX,120 where IMX, as the patent 
owner, identified its patent on its “Patent”121 and “Patent Press Release”122 
webpages within the IMX Exchange website.  Both webpages mentioned 
the IMX patent by reference and not by number, but used “IMX 
Exchange” to refer to the corporate entity and not to the patented 
system.123  Additionally, the term “patented technology” was used to 
describe a “unique loan information and real-time trading system” on one 
                                                 
117
 Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
118
 See Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Sys., Inc., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (stating that the 
purpose of the Marking Statute is to provide “in rem notice to the world” of patent 
protection). 
119
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
120
 IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C., No. Civ. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 WL 3465555 (D. Del. 
Dec. 14, 2005).  
121
 The statement on the “Patent” webpage provided: 
 
IMX(R) Patents  
IMX Exchange was awarded a patent in late 1999 for 
our unique loan information and real-time trading 
system. This was a milestone for IMX Exchange. We 
are pleased that the Patent Office has recognized the 
technology innovations created by our developers, 
and envisioned by our founder, Steve Fraser. 
Patent Press Release 
      Id. at *2. 
122
 The webpage “identifies the [patent-in-suit] patent by number and describes ‘the IMX 
Exchange invention [as] provid[ing] a method and system for trading loans in real time.’  
In the same document, ‘IMX Exchange’ is described as an ‘Internet-based, business-to-
business trading network.’”  Id. at *3 (alterations in original). 
123
 Id. at *3. 
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of the webpages,124and the same term was mentioned in connection with a 
“patented pricing technology” and not the IMX Exchange product on the 
other webpage.125  The court held that since the language on the two 
webpages was inconsistent as far as what fell within the scope of the 
patent-in-suit, IMX failed to provide public notice that its “IMX 
Exchange” system was protected by the patent-in-suit.126 The IMX 
decision suggests that had IMX used consistent language to describe the 
scope of its patent, or had it provided a more general patent statement, it 
would have satisfied the requirements of the Marking Statute. 
 
[31]  General patent statements have been permitted by the courts for a 
long time.  This middle ground between no notice and highly detailed 
notice has been held to be sufficient to establish the requisite nexus and 
satisfy the Marking Statute.  In Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes 
Tool Co.,127 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that marking a 
“patented article” with a statement that it was covered by “one or more of 
the following patents,” followed by several patent numbers, was sufficient 
to satisfy the statutory requirement.128  This view has been endorsed by the 
Federal Circuit and a recent district court decision.129  In Amsted 
                                                 
124
 Id. at *2.  
125
 Id. 
126
 Id. at *4.  
127
 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1951). 
128
 See id. at 626 (holding that marking a device as “patented by ‘one or more of the 
following patents’ followed by the numbers of the patents in suit, and others not presently 
in controversy” was sufficient to satisfy the Marking Statute).  Even though the decision 
predates the formation of the Federal Circuit, it is still good law.  See infra note 129 and 
accompanying text (holding that marking a tangible item with a statement that it is 
covered by “one or more of the following patents” was sufficient to create the requisite 
nexus and provide sufficient public notice). 
129
 See Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 786 F.2d 1124, 1125 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (affirming, in a suit for false patent marking, that a label stating that an item 
“is manufactured under one or more of the following U.S. Patents, or under one or more 
Patents Pending . . . and list[ing] thirty or so patents” was not deceptive in any way and 
provided sufficient public notice of patent protection); accord Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. 
Abacus Software, Inc., 5:01CV344, 2004 WL 5268123, *20 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2004) 
(citing CHISUM ON PATENTS, in turn citing Chicago Pneumatic, to “permit a listing of 
multiple patents with a statement that the article is covered by ‘one or more’ of those 
patents” as not intentionally deceptive under § 292, or false marking, and providing 
sufficient public notice of patent protection). 
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Industries Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co.,130 the Federal Circuit 
explained that the policy goal of the Marking Statute is to encourage the 
good faith effort to provide public notice.131  When the only tangible item 
available is not, or cannot be, treated as a “patented article,” the patent 
owner is not required to mark.132  However, the patent owner can assure 
its own compliance with the Marking Statute by marking items as “for use 
under U.S. X,XXX,XXX”133 or by requiring its licensees to mark items as 
“licensed under U.S. X,XXX,XXX.”134 
 
[32]  It is possible to provide a clear and consistent statement of patent 
protection, as suggested by IMX.135  However, given the ever-developing 
nature of websites and associated technologies, it appears more practical 
for the patent owner and its licensees to provide a more general patent 
statement that the website as a whole is covered by “one or more of the 
following patents.”136  This middle ground approach is generally accepted 
and avoids unnecessary difficulties inherent in the more detailed patent 
statements.  Even though a general statement provides a more blanket 
intellectual property statement, it does not implicate the false marking 
provisions of the Patent Act as long as the statement is provided as a good 
faith effort to provide public notice of patent protection under the Marking 
Statute. 
 
B.  ACTUAL NOTICE TO THE INFRINGER 
 
[33]  The Marking Statute provides that when the patent owner or its 
licensees fails to mark as required, “no damages shall be recovered . . . in 
any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified 
of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter….”137  Thus, 
sufficiency of notice focuses on whether the patentee’s actions were 
sufficient to provide notice and “not on what the infringer actually 
                                                 
130
 Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings, Co., 24 F.3d 178, 185 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
131
 Id. (citing Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537). 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. 
134
 Id. 
135
 See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text. 
136
 See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text. 
137
 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999). 
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knew.”138  Proper notice of infringement “must therefore come from the 
patentee, not the infringer.”139  It is also established that notice from a 
party “closely associated” with the patent owner, such as a distributor, 
does not satisfy the Marking Statute because only the patent owner has the 
statutory right to exclude others.140 
 
[34]  Absent marking, the actual notice requirement is satisfied when the 
accused infringer “is notified, with sufficient specificity, that the patent 
holder believes that the recipient of the notice may be an infringer.”141  In 
Amsted, the Federal Circuit explained that a letter notifying the entire 
industry, including the infringer, about the patent’s existence and 
ownership was insufficient to provide the requisite notice, absent a 
specific accusation of infringement.142  Proper notice “requires the 
                                                 
138
 See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(knowledge of the patent by the infringer is irrelevant to the finding of sufficient actual 
notice under the Marking Statute); see also Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 
Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the “correct approach to determining 
notice under section 287 must focus on the action of the patentee, not the knowledge 
understanding of the infringer.”). 
139
 Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also 
Devices for Med., Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that 
“[a]bsent notice, [the infringer’s] ‘knowledge of the patents’ is irrelevant.  Section 287 
requires ‘proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement.’”) (emphasis added). 
140
 Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that 
endorsing a rule of notice where a party closely associated with the patent owner could 
provide actual notice under § 287 would require courts to “decide the degree of 
association sufficient to satisfy the rule.”). The court reasoned that: 
 
[b]esides alerting the alleged infringer to avoid 
further infringement, the notice requirement also 
permits the alleged infringer to contact the patentee 
about an amicable and early resolution of the 
potential dispute. Thus, without knowledge of the 
patentee's identity, an alleged infringer may lose the 
benefit of this primary purpose of the notice 
requirement. An alleged infringer may lose the 
opportunity to consult with the patentee about design 
changes to avoid infringement. Similarly, without 
knowledge of the patentee, an alleged infringer may 
lose the chance to negotiate a valid license. 
      Id. 
141
 SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
142
 Amsted Indust., Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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affirmative communication of a specific charge of infringement by a 
specific accused product or device.”143  The actual notice requirement is 
satisfied when the accused infringer “is informed of the identity of the 
patent and the activity that is believed to be an infringement….”144  
However, the Federal Circuit recognized in SRI International, Inc. v. 
Advanced Technology Laboratories, Inc.,145 that actual notice may come 
in “numerous possible variations in form and content….”146  Thus, the 
proposed course of action the patent owner is demanding, “whether the 
[patent owner] threatens suit, demands cessation of infringement, or offers 
a license under the patent,”147 is irrelevant. 
 
[35]  Where the patent owner was required to mark its website with the 
relevant patents, but failed to do so, actual notice case law requires the 
patent owner, and the patent owner alone, to notify the infringer of patent 
protection and the allegedly infringing activity.148  While the Federal 
Circuit has stated that notice does not have to propose a particular 
resolution to the infringement in order to satisfy the Marking Statute,149 
notice must nonetheless be of infringement and not mere patent ownership 
and scope.150 
 
                                                 
143
 Id.; see also Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
144
 SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470; accord Amsted, 24 F.3d at 188, n. 5 (suggesting that the 
requirements of the Marking Statute are satisfied “where the infringer acknowledges a 
specific communication to be a notice of infringement.”); accord Ceeco Mach. Mfg., Ltd. 
v. Intercole, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 979, 986 (D. Mass. 1992) (stating that the express 
language of the Marking Statute does not require actual notice of infringement to include 
the same information required for marking: the word patent and the patent number). 
145
 SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470. 
146
 Id.; see also Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (holding that “offering of a license is [sufficient] actual notice” under the Marking 
Statute). 
147
 SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470. 
148
 See 35 U.S.C. 287(a) (1999); Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187; Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 
1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Devices for Med., Inc. v. Buehl, 833 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). 
149
 See SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1470; Ralston Purina, 772 F.2d at 1577. 
150
 See Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001); SRI Int’l., 127 F.3d 
at 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amsted, 24 F.3d at 187; Ceeco Mach. Mfg., Ltd., v. Intercole, 
Inc., 817 F.Supp. 979, 985-86 (D. Mass. 1992). 
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IV.  EXAMPLES OF WEBSITE MARKING 
 
[36]  In order to assist understanding of the issue involved and show actual 
compliance with the Marking Statute, the authors provide several 
examples of website patent marking.  These statements have not been 
tested in litigation, however the authors suggest that these examples 
constitute sufficient marking, under the legal discussion above, because 
they clearly provide public notice of patent protection. 
 
A.  BUY.COM 
 
[37]  Buy.com is an online shopping depot.151 At the bottom of its 
homepage and every other webpage, Buy.com provides a link to its 
“Terms of Use” which contains the user “Terms and Conditions.”152  In 
paragraph 18 of the Terms and conditions, Buy.com provides the 
following intellectual property statement: 
 
No delay or failure to take action under this Terms of Use 
shall constitute any waiver by Buy.com of any provision of 
this Terms of Use. . . . One or more patents may apply to 
this Web site, including without limitation: U.S. Patent 
Nos. 5,528,490; 5,761,649; and 6,029,142.153 
 
B.  A9.COM 
 
[38]  Search engine A9.com, like Buy.com, provides a “conditions of use” 
link on its homepage, and every other webpage.154  Following this link 
takes the user to the Conditions of Use, which users accept by visiting 
A9.com.  In the “Patents” section, A9.com provides the following 
intellectual property statement: 
 
One or more patents apply to this site and to the features 
and services accessible via the site, including without 
                                                 
151
 Buy.com, http://www.buy.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
152
 Id. 
153
 Buy.com, Company Information, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.buy.com/corp/legal.asp 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
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limitation: US Patent Nos. 6,006,225; 6,144,958; 
6,185,558; 6,401,084 and all corresponding foreign 
counterparts. This site may include technology licensed 
from Amazon.com, Inc. or one of its affiliates.155 
 
C.  AMAZON.COM 
 
[39]  Online superstore, Amazon.com, includes a very detailed statement 
of patent protection on its “Conditions of Use” webpage.  The interested 
user can find the “Conditions of Use” link at the bottom of every webpage 
that falls within the Amazon.com website.156  In the “Patents” section, 
Amazon.com provides the following intellectual property statement: 
 
One or more patents apply to this Site and to the features 
and services accessible via the Site, including without 
limitation: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,715,399; 5,960,411; 
6,006,225; 6,029,141; 6,064,980; 6,144,958; 6,169,986; 
6,185,558; 6,266,649; 6,317,722; 6,360,254; 6,366,910; 
6,401,084; 6,466,918; 6,489,968; 6,606,619; 6,853,982; 
6,853,993; 6,912,505; 6,917,922 and all corresponding 
foreign counterparts. Portions of this Site operate under 
license of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,708,780; 5,715,314; 
5,909,492; 6,205,437; 6,195,649; 5,717,860; 5,712,979; 
5,819,285; 6,782,370; and 5,812,769.157 
 
D.  MERCEXCHANGE 
 
[40]  MercExchange, e-commerce solution provider, has one of the more 
detailed intellectual property statements that the authors have found.  By 
clicking on the “About Us” link on the left-hand side of the homepage, 
and following the “Solutions” tab at the top, MercExchange provides a 
listing of eight patents, the scope and summary of the patent, the patent 
                                                 
155
 A9.com, Website Conditions of Use, Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.a9.com/-
/company/tou.jsp. 
156
 Amazon.com, http://amazon.com (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
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number, and a link to the pdf version of the issued patent.  One example is 
provided below. 
 
Method and Apparatus for Using Software Search 
Agents to Locate Items in Electronic Markets. This 
patent relates to a method of using software search agents 
to locate items in electronic markets or electronic auctions 
around the world. The ‘176 patent claims describe a system 
consisting of multiple electronic markets and electronic 
auctions interconnected over a computer network such as 
the Internet. The software search agent may be provided 
item identifying information and initiate requests to other 
electronic market or electronic auction to determine 
whether the item sought is available for purchase at such 
electronic markets or electronic auctions. Item information 
maintained in data repositories associated with the 
electronic markets or electronic auctions is obtained by the 
software search agent and collected for later use, such as 
for presenting the item search results obtained to Internet 
users. Patent Number: 6.085,176158 
 
E.  OTHER EXAMPLES 
 
[41]  Some companies like Friendster.com, Priceline.com, and uBid.com 
do not provide such comprehensive and complete patent statements.  At 
the bottom of every page included in the website is a brief patent 
statement: 
 
Friendster.com: 
U.S. Patent No. 7,069,308 & 7,117,254, and 7,188,153.159 
 
Priceline.com: 
U.S. Patents 5,794,207; 5,897,620; 6,085,169; 6,510,418 and 
6,553,346.160 
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uBid.com: 
 Protected by U.S. Patent Nos. 5,845,265; 6,202,051; 6,266,651 and 
pat. pending.161 
 
[42]  However, even these patent statements should be sufficient to 
provide public notice as is the underlying purpose of the Marking Statute. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[43]  Based on the foregoing discussion, the authors suggest that patent 
owners should mark all Internet websites that use, implement, or provide 
access to the patented technology.162  Websites are tangible items that are 
capable of being marked.163  When a website merely uses a patented 
method and the same website is not “produced” by the patented method,164 
presumably marking is not required because there is nothing to mark.165  
However, there is the possibility that a court will find that a website is 
“intrinsic” to the commercial embodiment166 or implements the patented 
method, and as such, can be treated as a “patented article” under the 
Marking Statute. 
 
[44]  Patent owners should also require their licensees, as a part of the 
licensing agreement, to mark websites that practice the patents167 and take 
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 Priceline.com, http://www.priceline.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
161
 uBid.com, http://www.ubid.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
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 See Sandra P. Thompson, Committee No. 757 -- Special Committee On Patents and 
the Internet, Subcomm. E., available at 
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/annualreport05/content/00-
01/COMMITTEE%20NO%20757.pdf (rejecting member-proposals that the marking 
statute be amended to include exceptions for Internet and other technology-related 
patents). 
163
 See Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F.Supp.2d 904, 909 (E.D. Tex. 
2005); IMX, Inc., v. Lending Tree, LLC, No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33179, at *12 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2005). 
164
 See Am. Med. Sys., Inc., v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
IMX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179, at *9, 11, 12 n. 4. 
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 See Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538; State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., 
Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
166
 See 35 U.S.C. 287(a) (1999); Rutherford v. Trim-Tex, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 158, 162 
(N.D. Ill. 1992); IMX, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179, at *12. 
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reasonable steps to police compliance with the Marking Statute.168  Such 
agreements combined with reasonable efforts to police compliance may 
allow the court, as in Maxwell, to find that failure to mark by licensees is 
not conclusive on the “substantially consistent and continuous”169 
requirement.  Licensing agreements should also provide for a cause of 
action against the licensee in the instance that it fails to mark a website 
and this lack of marking is the proximate cause of reduced damages. 
 
[45]  If there is no constructive notice, the patent owner itself will have to 
provide actual notice of infringement to the accused infringer or file an 
infringement lawsuit.170  Actual notice must be a specific charge of 
infringement and not just a statement of mere ownership.171  The proposed 
resolution to the infringement, be it a license, a threat of a lawsuit, or a 
cease and desist demand, does not effect the sufficiency of notice as long 
as the accused infringer can determine from the actual notice what activity 
the infringing charge is based upon.172   
 
[46]  Under such circumstances, another option for the patent owner is to 
only assert method claims at trial.173  While method claims may provide 
less protection than apparatus claims, 174 this is one possible way for the 
patent owner to avail itself of damages for infringement.  However, 
asserting only method claims in a combined patent may be risky.  This is 
based on the potential likelihood that the court will find that since the 
patent contains both method and apparatus claims, the website in question, 
a recognized tangible item, can be treated as a “patented article” and 
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 See Am. Med. Sys. 6 F.3d at 1537; Lisle Corp. v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 693, 695 (Fed. 
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should have been marked. 175  Additionally, asserting only method claims 
when marking was otherwise required but not provided may lead to a 
result that is at odds with the purpose of the Marking Statute.176  While a 
patent owner has complete discretion as to which claims to assert at trial, 
such election should not allow the patent owner to circumvent his marking 
duty.177 
 
[47]  Marking websites with patent information also makes economic 
sense.  If constructive notice of patent protection is provided by marking, 
damages are calculated from the date of infringement178 and the patent 
owner can recover damages for infringement committed over the past six 
years,179 absent other considerations.  On the other hand, when 
constructive notice is not provided, the patent owner can only recover 
those damages that occurred after actual notice, notification of 
infringement, or filing of the lawsuit.180  However, it is likely that 
infringing activity will stop once conclusive notice of infringement is 
received, and the only remedy available to the patent owner would be an 
injunction.181 
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